

Kamalasila's position on prasangaviparyaya

journal or publication title	Bulletin of the Institute of Buddhist Culture, Tsurumi University
number	13
page range	(1)-(12)
year	2008-04
URL	http://doi.org/10.24791/00000420



Kamalaśīla's position on *prasaṅgaviparyaya*⁽¹⁾

Ryusei Keira

1. Introduction

In his *Tattvasaṃgrahaḥapañjikā* (hereafter TSP) Kamalaśīla states *prasaṅgaviparyayas*, contrapositions of *prasaṅga*, in several arguments for refuting opponents' positions.⁽²⁾ However, Kamalaśīla in the TSP did not yet solve the problem of *āśrayāsiddha*, the fault that the subject of the proposition is unestablished.⁽³⁾ Therefore, when the subjects (*dharmin*) of propositions were things imagined by opponents, such as primordial matter (*pradhāna*) and God *Īśvara*, Kamalaśīla could not regard *prasaṅgaviparyayas* as autonomous reasoning (*svatantram sādhanam* / *svātantryeṇa sādhanam*) due to the fault of *āśrayāsiddha*.⁽⁴⁾ In addition, he also could not regard them as autonomous reasoning due to the fault of reasons being unestablished for one party of the debate (*anyatarāsiddha*). That is, for example, if the Buddhist proponent says that pseudo-entities like *Īśvara* are momentary (*kṣaṇikatva*) because they are existent (*sattva*), then since he cannot accept that *Īśvara* and so forth are existent, the reason is unestablished for the Buddhist proponent, although it would be established for the opponent. In order to

(1) The present article is a revised edition of the paper which I read in my presentation at the XIIIth Conference of the International Association of Buddhist Studies (IABS) held from 8th to 13th December 2002 at Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok.

(2) Normally, *prasaṅgas*, i.e., absurd consequences, have the following characteristics: (1) the *pakṣadharmatva*, the fact that the reason qualifies its subject, is not established for the proponent because *prasaṅga* uses a reason that is only accepted by opponents (*parasiddha*); (2) the absurd proposition, i.e., the consequence proven by a *prasaṅga*, will be unacceptable (*aniṣṭa*) to both the opponent and the proponent; (3) the pervasion (*vyāpti*) which constitutes a *prasaṅga* is established for both parties of debate. See IWATA (1993) p. 25, 15-24, and KAJIYAMA (1966) pp. 114, 14-118, 9 and fn. 313. See also KEIRA (2004) p. 180, fn. 305.

Prasaṅgaviparyayas can be regarded as the contrapositions of *prasaṅga*. That is to say, when *prasaṅgas* are regarded as stating that it follows that *A* is *B* because of *C*, then *prasaṅgaviparyayas* are regarded as stating that *A* is not *C* because of not being *B*. See TILLEMANS (2000) pp. 21-24.

(3) On *āśrayāsiddha* or *dharṃyasiddha*, see NB III 65 and NB† p. 199, 7-17. See also TILLEMANS (1999) pp. 171-185 and pp. 247-284, TILLEMANS (2000) pp. 194-210, KEIRA *ibid.* pp. 127-152 and pp. 196-202 and KOBAYASHI (1987).

(4) Different from *prasaṅga*, autonomous reasoning has the following characteristics: (1) the *pakṣadharmatva*, the fact that reason qualifies its subject, is established not only for the opponent but also for the proponent; (2) autonomous reasoning is applied to prove positively the things which the

avoid the faults of *āśrayāsiddha* and *anyatarāsiddha*, Kamalaśīla in the TSP seems to have taken the position that when subjects are pseudo-entities, reasons must be regarded as proving absurd consequences (*prasaṅga*).⁽⁵⁾

In his *Madhyamakālamkārapañjikā* (MAP), Kamalaśīla did not change his position on the problem of *āśrayāsiddha*. He says that when the subjects are things imagined by others, the “neither one nor many” reason (*ekānekaviyogahetu*) only proves an absurd consequence (*prasaṅga*).⁽⁶⁾ Therefore, it is clear that when the subjects are pseudo-entities like *Īśvara*, Kamalaśīla in the MAP also could not regard *prasaṅgaviparyayas* as autonomous reasonings due to the fault of *āśrayāsiddha*.

In his *Madhyamakāloka* (MĀ), which was written in the last period of his life, Kamalaśīla attempts to solve the problem of *āśrayāsiddha* and develops his ideas on the proofs of the absence of intrinsic nature (*niḥsvabhāvatā*) of all dharmas. Kamalaśīla says that when *sādhya* and *sādhana* are mere exclusions (*vyavacchedamātra*), the reason can be established with regard to an unreal *dharmin*.⁽⁷⁾ Due to this solution, the fault of *āśrayāsiddha* for Kamalaśīla will no longer be a reason to

proponent wants to prove, since it uses a reason (*hetu*) which is established for both parties of debate (*ubhayaśiddha*). See KEIRA *ibid.* pp. 179-196 and fn. 305.

5) See, e.g., TSP p. 54, 17-19: *yad utpattivikalam na tat kasyacit kāraṇam, yathā gaganāmbhojam, utpattivikalaś ceśvara iti vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhiḥ / prasaṅgasāadhanam cedam, tenāśrayāsiddhatā na codanīyā /*. See also TSP p. 143, 17-27: *tathā hi santo ye nāma te sarve kṣaṇabhāṅginah / tad yathā saṃskṛtā bhāvās tathāsiddhā anantaram // (TS k. 392) santaś cāmī tvayeṣyante vyomakāleśvarādayaḥ / (TS k. 393ab) ... tathā siddhā iti (/) kṣaṇikatvena / etena na sādhyavikalatā drṣṭāntasyāsaṅkanīyā, prasādhitatvād iti darśayati / tvayeṣyanta ity anena prasaṅgasāadhanam etad iti darśayati / anyathā hetor anyatarāsiddhatā syāt ... /*.

Note that in the TSP Kamalaśīla seems to hold that *prasaṅgasāadhanas* are regarded as stating mutual incompatibilities (*parasparavirodha*) in the opponent's position by means of a reason acknowledged only by the opponent. See TSP p. 885, 6-8: *tatrāpi prasaṅgasādhane ya evāvīcāraramaṇīyatayā āgamamātrāt parasya prasiddho dharmah sa eva sādhanatvena prakāsanīyaḥ parasparavirodhodbhāvanāya, na tv asau pramāṇena sādhanīyo niḥsprayojanatvāt /*. Cf. PVA p. 481, 28. See fn. (20).

(6) See MAP D88a2-5: *'o na 'di ci thal bar 'gyur bar sgrub pa yin nam / 'on te rang gi rgyud kyis sgrub pa yin / gal te dang po yin par rtog na ni de'i tshes gtan tshigs ma grub pa yin te / gzhan dag dngos po thams cad la gcig dang du ma dang bral ba khas mi len pa'i phyir ro // ji ste gnyis pa yin no zhe na ni / de lta na yang shin tu ma grub pa yin te / bdag nyid gzhi khas mi len pa'i phyir dang / phyir rgol ba la yang rang gi ngo bo ma grub pa'i phyir ro snyam du dogs pa la gtan tshigs 'di ma grub bo snyam du ma sems shig ces bya ba smos so // ji ltar snyam pa la / 'bras bu rim can nyer sbyor bas // zhes bya ba la sogs pa smos so // 'di snyam du sems te / re zhig gzhan dag gis brtags pa nam mkha' la sogs pa'i dngos po ma grags pa'i rang gi ngo bo gang dag yin pa de la ni thal bar bsgrub pa kho na yin la / grags pa'i rang gi ngo bo rnam la ni gnyi ga ltar yang nyes pa med de /*

(7) See MĀ D172a6-7: *gang la dngos po'i chos yod pa'i ngo bor sgrub par mi 'dod kyi (CD kyi: GNP kyi /) 'on kyang sgro btags pa'i chos rnam par gcad (CD rnam par gcad: GNP rnam par bcad) pa sgrub pa tсам zhig brjod par (DGNP par: C pa) 'dod pa de la ni ma grub pa nyid la sogs pa'i (CD pa'i: GNP pa'i /) nyes pa brjod pa tha snyad du yang dngos por gyur pa'i chos can mi dgos te /*

say that *prasaṅgaviparyaya* cannot be regarded as autonomous reasoning. Therefore, Kamalaśīla can regard *prasaṅgaviparyaya* as an autonomous reasoning if he states a reason which is established for both parties of debate (*ubhayasiddha*). Here, the following question will arise: Would Kamalaśīla's position in the MĀ be close to that of Dharmottara who regarded *prasaṅgaviparyaya* as an autonomous reasoning, rather than that of Prajñākaragupta who rejects Dharmottara's position? In order to reply to this question, we clarify Kamalaśīla's final position of *prasaṅgaviparyaya* by analyzing the arguments in the second chapter of the MĀ. In his MĀ Kamalaśīla does not explicitly explain his position on *prasaṅga* and *prasaṅgaviparyaya*. However, our analyses of the arguments in the MĀ would permit us to say that Kamalaśīla in the MĀ also does not seem to follow Dharmottara's position on *prasaṅgaviparyaya*, although Kamalaśīla's position on the proof of the nonexistence of a pseudo-entity seems to be different from that of Prajñākaragupta.

2. Kamalaśīla's position in the MĀ and the difference from Dharmottara's position

In Dharmottara's *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā* (PVinṬ), the opponent states the following *prasaṅga* and *prasaṅgaviparyaya*:

(1) [*Prasaṅga*:] If the universal (*sāmānya*) were to be one [in nature], then it would follow absurdly that the universal is not present in many things.

(2) [*Prasaṅgaviparyaya*:] When the universal is present in many things, then it follows that the universal is not one [in nature].⁽⁸⁾

Dharmottara's opponent says that the reason of his *prasaṅga* cited above consists in perception of something incompatible with the pervader (*vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhi*) and that his *prasaṅgaviparyaya* has a reason which consists in perception of what is pervaded by an incompatible thing (*viruddhavyāptopalabdhi*). Since that

“When one does not wish to prove that a property of entities is an existent nature but instead wishes to state a proof of the mere exclusion of a superimposed property, then the [reason] with regard to which the faults such as being unestablished would be pointed out does not require even conventionally any property-possessor which is an entity.” See KEIRA *ibid.* p. 128, fn. 207.

(8) See PVinṬ D11a1-3: *kha cig tu ni thal ba 'am thal ba las bzlog pa'i gtan tshigs kyang rtsa bar mi 'gyur te / ma grub pa'i phyir ro // dper na kha cig na re gal te spyi gcig yin na gcig yin pa'i phyir du ma la yod par mi 'gyur ba zhig na / du ma la yod pa yang yin te / de'i phyir gcig ma yin no zhes bya ba 'di la thal bar 'gyur ba khyab par byed pa 'gal ba dmigs pa dang / bzlog pa 'gal bas khyab pa dmigs pa gnyi ka ma grub pa dang / ... /*. For a German translation, see IWATA (1993) pp. 51-52. According to Bu ston, this opponent in PVinṬ seems to be Vinītadeva. See IWATA *ibid.* pp. 50-51.

opponent's *prasaṅgaviparyaya* states a reason which is acknowledged only by opponent, but not by proponent, and does not state fundamental reason (*maulo hetu*), this type of *prasaṅgaviparyaya* cannot be regarded as an autonomous reasoning.⁽⁹⁾

Although in his TSP Kamalaśīla stated *prasaṅgas* which were structurally similar to the above-cited *prasaṅga* of Dharmottara's opponent,⁽¹⁰⁾ in the MĀ Kamalaśīla, as far as I know, does not state that opponent type of *prasaṅga*. However, we can find in the MĀ Kamalaśīla's proofs which structurally correspond to that opponent's *prasaṅgaviparyaya* which was cited above.

In the second chapter of the MĀ Kamalaśīla explains how the "neither one nor many" reason (*ekānekaviyogahetu*) can be established with regard to invisible subjects like *ātman* and *Īśvara*. He says:

"Although it is not accepted by others that entities are neither one nor many, they do acknowledge properties that are pervaded (*vyāpta*) by [being neither one nor many]. Therefore, the latter [i.e., being neither one nor many] is also in fact acknowledged by implication (*shugs kyis, sāmarchyāt*)."⁽¹¹⁾

For example, when Kamalaśīla proves that the absence of oneness (*ekatva*) can be established with regard to *Īśvara*, he says:

"Those who imagine *Īśvara* and so forth as having permanence and

(9) For the concept of fundamental reason (*maulo hetu*), see IWATA (1993) pp. 48-49, pp. 54-56 and pp. 68-69 and IWATA (1996) p. 12. The *maulo hetu* seems to mean a triply characterized reason (*trirūpalīṅga*). So the fact that the reason qualifies its subject, i.e., *pakṣadharmatva*, is established for both parties of debate. The *maulo hetu* is applied to prove positively the things which the proponent wants to prove.

(10) See IWATA (1993) p. 53, Anm. 55. Kamalaśīla's *prasaṅga* is as follows: (TSP p. 201, 21-23:) *yad ekaṃ tad ekadravyāśritaṃ yathaikaḥ paramāṇuḥ ekaṃ cāvayavisañjñitaṃ dravyam iti vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhiprasaṅgaḥ* /. "[Vyāpti:] What is one [in nature] is qualified by one substance. It is just like, for example, one [single] atom (*paramāṇu*). [Pakṣadharmatva:] Now, a substance designated as a whole (*avayavin*) is one [in nature]. [Implicit conclusion: Therefore, a substance designated as a whole is qualified by one substance, i.e., one part, and is nonexistent in many parts.] The above is [the statement of] a reason consisting in perception of something incompatible with the pervader (*vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhi*), which proves an absurd consequence." Kamalaśīla also states the following *prasaṅga*: (TSP p. 202, 12-14:) *prayogaḥ – yad ekavastukroḍīkṛtaṃ vastu na tat tadānīm evānyatra varttate / yathaikadhātrīkroḍīkṛtaḥ śīśur na dhātryantarakroḍam adhyāste ekāvayavakroḍīkṛtaṃ ca dravyam iti vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhiḥ* /.

(11) MĀ D215b2-3: 'dir thal bar sgrub (CD 'dir thal bar sgrub: GNP 'di thal ba sgrub) na gtan tshigs ma grub pa yang ma yin te / 'di ltar ji ste pha rol po dag gis dngos po rnam gzig dang du ma dang bral bar khas ma blangs su zin kyang / 'on kyang des khyab pa'i chos khas blangs pa'i phyir shugs kyis ni (CD ni: GP na; N ill.) de yang khas blangs pa kho na yin te /. See KEIRA ibid. pp. 180-181 and fn. 306.

(12) MĀ D215b3-4: gang gis dbang phyug la sogs pa rtag (CDP rtag: GN brtag) pa dang gzig

oneness acknowledge that [*Īśvara* and so forth] have the property of influencing results produced successively, and therefore they also in fact acknowledge the absence of oneness by implication.”⁽¹²⁾

From this statement, we understand that Kamalaśīla states here the following proof:

When *Īśvara* has the property of influencing successive results, then it follows that *Īśvara* is not one [in nature].

Structurally, this proof corresponds to Dharmottara’s opponent type of *prasaṅgaviparyaya* as cited above. That is to say, first, just like the reason of Dharmottara’s opponent type of *prasaṅgaviparyaya*, the reason of Kamalaśīla’s proof also seems to consist in perception of what is pervaded by an incompatible thing (*viruddhavyāptopalabdhi*), since the property of influencing successive results is pervaded by manyness (*anekatva*), which is incompatible with oneness (*ekatva*). Second, the reason in this proof by Kamalaśīla is also acknowledged only by the opponent, but not by the Buddhist proponent, since the *pakṣadharmatva*, the fact that the reason qualifies its subject, is not established for the Buddhist proponent. That is, it is not true for the Buddhist proponent that *Īśvara* would have the property of influencing successive results. Therefore, this proof of Kamalaśīla is structurally almost the same as Dharmottara’s opponent type of *prasaṅgaviparyaya*, and thus it cannot also be regarded as autonomous reasoning.

Kamalaśīla’s proofs of the establishment of the “neither one nor many” reason are structurally different from Dharmottara type of *prasaṅgaviparyaya*, since, for example, Kamalaśīla’s proof of *Īśvara*’s absence of oneness can be regarded as the contraposition of the following *prasaṅga*:

If *Īśvara* were to be one in nature, then it would follow absurdly that *Īśvara* does not have the property of influencing successive results.

This *prasaṅga* structurally corresponds to Dharmottara’s opponent type of *prasaṅga* as cited above, and is different from Dharmottara type of *prasaṅga*,

pu’i ngo bo nyid du kun brtags pa de dag gis ni de dag ’bras bu rim gyis ’byung ba la nye bar sbyor ba nyid kyi chos su khas blangs pa’i phyir shugs kyis na gcig gi ngo bo nyid dang bral pa yang khas blangs pa nyid de /. See KEIRA ibid. pp. 181-182.

(13) In his PVinṬ Dharmottara states the following *prasaṅgas*: (1) If the universal (*sāmanya*) were to be present in many things (*anekavṛttitva*), then it would follow absurdly that the universal is many (*anekatva*) [in nature]. (2) If *ātman* and so forth were to be existent, then it would follow absurdly that *ātman* and so forth are momentary (*kṣaṇikatva*). See PVinṬ D6b1-3: *thal bar bsgrub pa la ni khyab par bya ba’i chos gzhan gyis ’dod par mthong nas mi ’dod kyang khyad par byed pa’i chos grub par thal bar brjod pa yin te / khyab par bya ba ni khyab par byed pa med par mi ’byung ba’i phyir no // dper na spyi la sogs pa du ma la yod par ’dod pa na / mi ’dod kyang du ma nyid du thal ba ’am / bdag la sogs pa yod pa nyid yin na skad cig ma nyid du thal ba bzhin no //*. See also IWATA ibid. pp. 40-41, pp. 45-46 and p. 50.

because in this case Dharmottara type of *prasaṅga* would be as follows:

If *Īśvara* were to have the property of influencing successive results, then it would follow absurdly that *Īśvara* is many in nature.⁽¹³⁾

From this *prasaṅga*, we can draw the following contraposition of *prasaṅga*, which would be a Dharmottara type of *prasaṅgaviparyaya*:

When *Īśvara* is not many in nature, then it follows that *Īśvara* does not have the property of influencing successive results.⁽¹⁴⁾

The reason of this *prasaṅgaviparyaya* consists in nonperception of the pervader (*vyāpakānupalabdhi*), since influencing successive results implies manyness. For Dharmottara, it is possible to regard this *prasaṅgaviparyaya* as an autonomous reasoning, because the fact that *Īśvara* is not many in nature, i.e., *pakṣadharmatva*, is established for both parties of debate, since reasons consisting in mere absence (*abhāvamātra* / *virahamātra*) can be established with regard to pseudo-entities⁽¹⁵⁾ and because the consequence proven by this *prasaṅgaviparyaya*, i.e., that *Īśvara* does not have the property of influencing successive results, is true for the Buddhist proponent. Thus, Kamalaśīla's proofs, such as proof of *Īśvara*'s absence of oneness, are structurally different from Dharmottara type of *prasaṅgaviparyaya*.

Now, Kamalaśīla's method for proving that the "neither one nor many" reason can be established by implication from other accepted properties already figures in his MAP. He says in the MAP:

"In this case, first, a [pseudo-entity] such as *ātman* and the like, although of a nature unacknowledged [by Buddhists], is nonetheless accepted [by non-Buddhist opponents] as being one in nature. Still, [these non-Buddhist opponents] accept them [i.e., *ātman*, etc.] as contribut-

(14) In his PVinT Dharmottara states the following *prasaṅgaviparyaya*: When the universal is not many [in nature], then it follows that the universal is not present in many things. See PVinT D7b7-8a1: *yul tha dad pa la sogs pa la yod pa ni 'gal ba'i chos dang ldan pas khyab la / de yang du ma nyid yin pa'i phyir du ma'i bdag nyid kyis kyang khyab par 'gyur ro // khyab par byed pa mi dmigs pa 'di ni grub pa yin pa'i phyir thal ba bzlog pa'i gtan tshigs ni 'di nyid las rtogs par bya ba yin te / 'ga' zhig yul la sogs pa du ma la (P la: D om.) yod pa de ni du ma nyid yin la / spyi yang de lta yin pa'i phyir du ma nyid du 'gyur na du ma nyid ma yin no zhes bya ba ni thal ba las bzlog pa'o //*. For a German translation, see IWATA *ibid.* pp. 45-46. See PVinT (ad PVin D188a6-7) D8a3-5: *thal bar 'gyur ba'i dgos pa bshad pa ni thal bar 'gyur ba de ni khyab par bya ba'i chos gcig du ma la 'jug pa nyid khas blangs na / khyab par byed pa gghan du ma nyid khas blangs pa bstan pa'i phyir yin te / khyab par byed pa de (PVin de: D des) khas mi len na khyab par bya ba dang khyab par byed pa'i chos gnyi ga ldog par 'gyur ro zhes pa ni bzlog pa'i don to //*. See IWATA *ibid.* pp. 55-56.

(15) See PVinT D6b4: *khyab par byed pa med pa de ni spyi la sogs pa med pa la yang grub pa nyid do //*. See also *ibid.* D8a2: *du ma med pa tsam nyid ni spyi med pa [la]* yang grub pa yin no //*. [*DP omit la.] See IWATA *ibid.* p 55, Anm. 57.

ing to a series of results, such as cognitions and so forth. [Therefore,] since the absence of oneness is derived by implication [from *ātman* etc. producing a series of results], first, [*ātman*, etc.] are in fact established as being without oneness.”⁽¹⁶⁾

As was explained earlier, Kamalaśīla in the MAP did not yet solve the problem of *āśrayāsiddha*. Although in the MĀ Kamalaśīla attempts to solve the problem of *āśrayāsiddha*, nonetheless, he relies upon the same method when he proves the establishment of the “neither one nor many” reason. Kamalaśīla in the MĀ seems to have only developed his ideas on the problem of *āśrayāsiddha*, but not his ideas on *prasaṅgaviparyaya*.

3. The Difference between Kamalaśīla’s and Prajñākaragupta’s positions

Prajñākaragupta’s position on *prasaṅga* and *prasaṅgaviparyaya* has already been analyzed by some modern scholars.⁽¹⁷⁾ His position on *prasaṅgaviparyaya* seems to be that when the subjects of propositions are pseudo-entities like *pradhāna*, *prasaṅgaviparyaya* is applied to state a mutual incompatibility (*parasparavirodha-prakatanapara*) in the opponent’s position and cannot be regarded as an autonomous reasoning, because, otherwise, the fault of *āśrayāsiddha* would occur. Moreover, reasons consisting in nonperception of the pervader (*vyāpakānupalabdhi*) cannot prove the nonexistence of pseudo-entities,⁽¹⁸⁾ because the fact that the reasons qualify their subjects (*pakṣadharmatva*) would not be established. According to IWATA (1993), Prajñākaragupta’s position on *prasaṅga* and *prasaṅgaviparyaya* seems to be close to that of Dharmottara’s opponent, which was explained earlier, rather than that of Dharmottara.⁽¹⁹⁾ Therefore, it might be possible to say that in the aspect that *prasaṅgaviparyaya* cannot be regarded as an autonomous reasoning in the case of subjects being pseudo-entities, Kamalaśīla’s position is similar to that of Prajñā-

(16) MAP D88a5-6: *de la re zhig bdag la sogs pa ma grags pa’i rang gi ngo bo rnams kyang rang bzhin gcig pa nyid du khas blangs mod kyi / de dag ni ’bras bu rim can rnām par shes pa la sogs pa la nye bar sbyor bar khas len te / shugs kyis rang bzhin gcig pa nyid med pa ’dren par byed pas re zhig gcig pa nyid dang bral bar grub pa kho na yin no //*. See KEIRA *ibid.* p. 181, fn. 306.

(17) See TANI (1983) and (1987) and IWATA (1993).

(18) See IWATA *ibid.* pp. 77-79.

(19) See IWATA *ibid.* pp. 65-66. In his PVA Prajñākaragupta states the following *prasaṅga*: If the universal were to be qualified by one single entity, then it would follow absurdly that the universal is not connected to other entities. See PVA p. 481, 21: *yady evaṃ ekavyaktiniṣṭhatvaṃ tadā na deśa-viśeṣavatānyena yogah /*. Prajñākaragupta’s *prasaṅgaviparyaya* is as follows: When the universal is connected to other entities, then it follows that the universal is not qualified by one single entity. See PVA p. 481, 22: *yady anyena yoga ekavyaktiniṣṭhatvaṃ na syāt ... /*.

karagupta, rather than that of Dharmottara. However, it does not seem correct to say that Kamalaśīla's position on *prasaṅgaviparyaya* would be completely the same as that of Prajñākaragupta. This is because Kamalaśīla's position on the proof of the nonexistence of a pseudo-entity seems to be different from that of Prajñākaragupta. That is, Prajñākaragupta refuted Dharmottara's position on *prasaṅgaviparyaya* by saying that when subjects are pseudo-entities, the fact that the reason qualifies its subject (*pakṣadharmatva*) would not be established and that one could not state a reason consisting in nonperception of the pervader (*vyāpakānupalabdhihetu*) in order to prove the nonexistence of a pseudo-entity. However, Kamalaśīla does not seem to accept Prajñākaragupta's reasons for refuting Dharmottara's position on *prasaṅgaviparyaya*.

First, Kamalaśīla does not accept Prajñākaragupta's idea that because the fault of *āśrayāsiddha* would occur, one cannot regard *prasaṅgaviparyaya* as being an autonomous reasoning. Prajñākaragupta says:

“If this [negation of both properties (*ubhayadharmanivṛtti*) stated in the *prasaṅga* and *prasaṅgaviparyaya*] were to be a position established [for the proponent], the fault of the subject being unestablished would occur. Those [*prasaṅga* and *prasaṅgaviparyaya*] are just regarded as stating a mutual incompatibility [in the opponent's position].”⁽²⁰⁾

Kamalaśīla says that when *sādhya* and *sādhana* are mere exclusions, reason can be established with regard to unreal subjects.⁽²¹⁾ Therefore, for Kamalaśīla, the fault of *āśrayāsiddha* does not serve as the reason for saying that when subject are pseudo-entities, *prasaṅgaviparyaya* cannot be regarded as autonomous reasoning.

Second, Kamalaśīla does not accept Prajñākaragupta's idea that reasons consisting in nonperception of the pervader (*vyāpakānupalabdhi*) cannot be applied to prove the nonexistence of pseudo-entities. Kamalaśīla says in the MĀ:

“*Īśvara* and so forth must invariably be negated only by negating the property of the pervader. This is because such completely impercepti-

(20) See PVA p. 481, 28: *yady ayam sthitapakṣaḥ syād bhaved dharmyasiddhidoṣaḥ paraspara-virodhaprakāṣanaparam evaitat*. For a German translation, see IWATA *ibid.* pp. 112, 18-113, 3. See also IWATA *ibid.* pp. 66-69.

(21) See fn. (7).

See PVinTḍ6b4: *khyab par byed pa med pa de ni spyi la sogs pa med pa la yang grub pa nyid do //*. See also PVA pp. 482, 32-483, 2: *virahād iti ca hetuḥ prasajyapratishedharūpaḥ / sa cābhāve pi sāmānyasya siddha eva / na hy abhāve hetau vasturūpo dharmy abhyupagamyate /*.

(22) MĀ D219b6-7: *dbang phyug la sogs pa de ni gdon mi za bar khyab bar byed pa'i chos bkaḡ pa kho nas dgag par bya dgos te / shin tu lkog tu gyur pa de mngon sum du dgag par mi nus pa'i phyr ro //*. See KEIRA *ibid.* p. 208 and fn. 374.

ble things cannot be directly negated.”⁽²²⁾

In the MĀ Kamalaśīla develops his ideas on the proofs of the absence of intrinsic nature. He holds that although it is impossible to prove the nonexistence of an imperceptible pseudo-entity by means of a reason consisting in nonperception of a perceptible object (*upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptasyānupalabdhi / dṛśyānupalabdhi*), one can prove it by means of nonperception of the pervader.

Prajñākaragupta seems to hold that in the proof of the nonexistence of an imperceptible pseudo-entity, if one stated a reason consisting in nonperception of the pervader, the *pakṣadharmatva*, the fact that reason qualifies its subject, could not be established. He says:

“If what is a mere absence were to be a reason, how [could] it prove the *sādhyā*, because it [can]not be related to any [subject (*dharmin*)]?”⁽²³⁾

However, Kamalaśīla does not accept this idea of Prajñākaragupta. Kamalaśīla proves in his MĀ that even when subjects are invisible things like *Īśvara*, the “neither one nor many” reason, which consists in nonperception of the pervader, can be established for both parties of debate.⁽²⁴⁾ Therefore, since the *pakṣadharmatva* can

(23) PVA p. 483, 6: *virahamātrakasya hetutve tasya kenacid asambandhāt katham sādhyā-sādhanam /*. See PVAṬ (Ya) D27a5: *de (tasya) zhes bya ba bral ba tsam (D tsam: P tsam dang) ni chos can gang dang yang ngo // spyi dngos po ma yin pa'i phyir (D phyir: P om.) sgrub par byed pa (P pa: D pa dang) bral ba tsam de dang 'brel ba ma yin no // ci ltar bsgrub bya sgrub par byed pa yin zhes bya ba ni gchi ma grub pa'i phyir ro //*. See IWATA ibid. p. 124, Anm. 50.

(24) See p. 4 and fn. (11), i.e., MĀ D215b2-3. See also MĀ D217b2: *de nyid kyi phyir rang gi rgyud kyi bsgrub pa la yang gtan tshigs ma grub pa nyid ma yin te / ji skad bshad pa'i tshul gyis rgol ba dang phyir rgol ba gnyi ga la yang chos thams cad gcig dang du ma dang bral ba tsam du grub pa'i phyir ro //*. “Thus, the reason is also not unestablished when the proof is effectuated autonomously (*svātantryeṇa*). This is because if we proceed in the way which we just explained, [i.e., if we prove that the reason is established by implication from other accepted properties,] it can be established to both the proponent and the opponent that all dharmas are simply neither one nor many.” See KEIRA ibid. p. 196.

(25) Prajñākaragupta also seems to have the following idea: When subjects are pseudo-entities, no copresence (*anvaya*) could be established for the proponent. An essential connection (*pratibandha*) or a pervasion (*vyāpti*) should be grasped by means of *anvaya*. When an *anvaya* is established, the co-absence (*vyatireka*) is also established by implication from that *anvaya*, in the way that where the pervader (*vyāpaka*) is absent, there the pervaded (*vyāpya*) is absent. Therefore, when subjects are pseudo-entities, one cannot state a reason consisting in nonperception of the pervader (*vyāpakānupalabdhi*). See PVA p. 483, 15-16: *pratibandhe saty ekābhāvo 'nyābhāvaṃ gamayet / pratibandhaś cānvayena ghyate / atas tatsāmarthyād yatra vyāpako nāsti tatra vyāpyābhāva iti vipakṣe 'bhāvamātram ādarśyate / na sa maulo hetuḥ /*.

On the problem of the nonestablishment of *anvaya*, Kamalaśīla says in the “neither one nor many” argument that the *anvaya* can be established for the Mādhyamikas. However, his idea seems to be applicable only to the case of subjects being conventionally established entities. That is, according to

be established, it is possible for Kamalaśīla to state a reason consisting in non-perception of the pervader in order to prove the nonexistence of an imperceptible pseudo-entity.⁽²⁵⁾

4. Conclusion

We see thus Kamalaśīla in the MĀ also does not seem to follow Dharmottara's position on *prasaṅgaviparyaya*, although Kamalaśīla's position on the proof of the nonexistence of a pseudo-entity is different from that of Prajñākaragupta. This fact would permit us to conclude that although Kamalaśīla in the MĀ attempted to solve the problem of *āśrayāsiddha* and developed his ideas on the proofs of the absence of intrinsic nature of all dharmas, nonetheless, he did not develop his position on *prasaṅgaviparyaya*.

Kamalaśīla does not seem to have been in favor of Dharmottara-style *prasaṅgaviparyayas* for proving the nonexistence of pseudo-entities, although both he and Dharmottara held that one could prove the nonexistence of an imperceptible pseudo-entity by means of a reason consisting in nonperception of the pervader (*vyāpakānupalabdhi*).

Abbreviations and Literature

C	Co ne Tibetan Tripiṭaka.
D	sDe dge Tibetan Tripiṭaka.
G	Golden Manuscript.

Kamalaśīla, the Mādhyamikas accept the following *anvaya*: what has an intrinsic nature is conventionally one or many in nature. The *anvaya* is established with regard to conventional subjects (*dharmīn*) or in reliance upon the conventional truth, and the *vyatireka* is established in reliance upon the ultimate truth. See MĀ D219a3-b1 and D189a2-6 and see KEIRA *ibid.* pp. 204-206 and fn. 366. Although the *anvaya* can be established when subjects are conventionally established entities, it could not be established with regard to pseudo-entities like *Īśvara* which the Mādhyamikas do not acknowledge even conventionally. The Mādhyamikas hold that *Īśvara* and so forth have neither ultimate intrinsic nature nor conventional intrinsic nature. Therefore, the Mādhyamikas cannot say that *Īśvara* which has a conventional intrinsic nature would be one or many.

It seems proper to hold that Kamalaśīla does not accept the above-mentioned idea of Prajñākaragupta, since Kamalaśīla says that a *vyāpakānupalabdhīhetu* can be applied to prove the nonexistence of a pseudo-entity. However, it is not clear how Kamalaśīla rejects Prajñākaragupta's idea, although Kamalaśīla might have held that without the establishment of *anvaya*, one can prove the nonexistence of a pseudo-entity only by means of *vyatireka*. In the MĀ Kamalaśīla only says that even when subjects are pseudo-entities, the "neither one nor many" reason can be established for both parties of debate, and due to its establishment, the absence of intrinsic nature is necessarily established, because by the exclusion of the parvader (*vyāpaka*, i.e., oneness and manyness), the parvaded (*vyāpya*, i.e., intrinsic nature) is excluded.

- ill. illegible.
- Iwata (1993) Iwata, Takashi. *prasaṅga und prasaṅgaviparyaya bei Dharmakīrti und seinen Kommentatoren*. WSTB 31. Vienna.
- Iwata (1996) Iwata, Takashi. 『知識論決擇』 (*Pramāṇaviniścaya*) 第三章 (他者の為の推論章) 和譯研究 ad v. 2: 他者の為の推論の定義の *svadrṣṭa* について (3), 帰謬 (*prasaṅga*) 論證の妥當性. 東洋の思想と宗教 13: 1-23.
- Iwata (1997) Iwata, Takashi. *Pramāṇaviniścaya* III (2). WZKS 41: 207-231.
- Kajiyama (1966) Kajimaya, Yuichi. An Introduction to Buddhist Philosophy: An annotated translation of the *Tarkabhāṣā* of *Mokṣākaragupta*. *Memoirs of the Faculty of Letters* 10, Kyoto University. Reprinted in *Y. Kajiyama, Studies in Buddhist Philosophy: Selected papers*.
- Keira (2004) Keira, Ryusei. *Mādhyamika and Epistemology: A study of Kamalaśīla's method for proving the voidness of all dharmas; Introduction, annotated translations and Tibetan texts of selected sections of the second chapter of the Madhyamakāloka*. WSTB 59. Vienna.
- Kobayashi (1987) Kobayashi, Mamoru. 無自性性論證と所依不成(*āśrayāsiddha*)の問題: カマラシーラの『中觀明』を中心として. 東北大学文学会文化50-3/4: 218-199.
- MAP *Madhyamakālaṃkārapañjikā* of Kamalaśīla, D3886, P5286.
- MĀ *Madhyamakāloka* of Kamalaśīla, C133b6-242a4, D3887, G3286, N3278, P5287.
- N sNar thang Tibetan Tripiṭaka.
- NB(T) Dharmakīrti: *Nyāyabindu* (Dharmottara: *Nyāyabinduṭīkā*). D. Malvania, *Paṇḍita Durveka Miśra's Dharmottarapradīpa: Being a subcommentary on Dharmottara's Nyāyabinduṭīkā, a commentary on Dharmakīrti's Nyāyabindu*. Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, 1955, Second edition 1971.
- om. omit; omitted.
- P Peking Tibetan Tripiṭaka.
- PVA *Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra* of Prajñākaragupta: R. Sāṅkrtyāyan, ed. *Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣyam or Vārttikālaṃkāraḥ of Prajñākaragupta: Being a commentary on Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttikam*. Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, 1953.
- PVAṬ(Ya) *Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāraṭīkā supariśuddhā nāma* of Yamāri, D4226, P5723.
- PVin *Pramāṇaviniścaya* of Dharmakīrti, D4211, P5710.
- PVinṬ *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā* of Dharmottara, D4229 (= Chapter I, II) + 4227 (= Chapter III), P5727.
- Tani (1983) Tani, Tadashi. *Prasaṅgasādhana Dōnyū niyoru Ronrieki no Kōzōhenkan*: Dhar-

Kamalaśīla's position on *prasaṅgaviparyaya*

mottara to Prajñākaragupta no Kaishaku no Sai. *Bukkyōgaku* 15: 1-27.

Tillemans (1999) Tom. J.F. Tillemans. *Scripture, logic, language: Essays on Dharmakīrti and his Tibetan successors*. Boston: Wisdom Publications.

Tillemans (2000) Tom. J.F. Tillemans. *Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttika: An annotated translation of the fourth chapter (parārthānumāna). Volume 1 (k. 1-148)*. VKSKS 32. Vienna.

TS *Tattvasaṃgraha* of Śāntarakṣita: E. Krishnamacharya, ed. *Tattvasaṃgraha of Śāntarakṣita: With the Commentary of Kamalaśīla*. Gaekwad's Oriental Series 30, 31. Baroda, 1926. Reprinted in 1984.

TSP *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā* of Kamalaśīla. See TS.